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DE PAUL LAW REVIEW
The next paragraph of the opinion states that "Where there is no
mistake, unreasonable delay, or the like, there can be no injustice in
holding the bidder to the conditions of the Invitation for Bids."'15 One
might point out the injustice in denying to this plaintiff a right that all
offerors have had for centuries, namely, the right to revoke an offer at
any time before acceptance.
In the decision as a whole, the court seems to object to the grounds
for the plaintiff's attempted revocation and to penalize the plaintiff for
lacking what the court considers justifiable grounds for revocation. The
groundlessness of this reasoning is apparent from the fact that the gen-
eral rule is that revocation of an offer requires no such justification. An
offer, not under seal or for a consideration, may be revoked at any time
before acceptance, regardless of the offeror's reasons for so doing.10
. It is probable that the court could have reached the same result on
the more logical ground that Congress, under the powers to wage war
and to maintain an army, could change the common law as to army
contracts, and that the regulations, which were promulgated under an
act of Congress, had the effect of rendering the offer irrevocable. One
might speculate that Judge Madden who wrote such fine decisions in
the Miller case and the Dick case, concurred in the seemingly unfounded
legal reasoning promulgated in the instant opinion because he realized
that he would have to concur in the result, if the above reasoning were
adopted.
In the light of the Dick case and the Refining Associates case, a law-
yer will now have a difficult time advising a client as to any contractual
problem which might arise before the Court of Claims.
TAXATION-SALES FOR "USE OR CONSUMPTION"
UNDER RETAILERS' OCCUPATION TAX ACT
Plaintiff dairy company brought this action against the Illinois Depart-
ment of Revenue to obtain credit for taxes paid from 1944 to 1947 on
gross receipts from sales of milk to a state mental institution. The milk
was purchased by the institution for consumption by inmates. The Cir-
cuit Court of Kane County entered judgment for plaintiff, and defendant
appealed. The Supreme Court of Illinois reversed and remanded, holding
that the legislative intent in passing the Retailers' Occupation Tax was
to reach sales to purchasers for use or consumption and that it intended
the tax to apply wherever the contemplated use of the tangible personal
property would take such property off the retail market. Modern Dairy
Company, Inc. v. Department of Revenue, 413 Ill. 55, 108 N.E. 2d 8
(1952).
16 Rest., Contracts § 41 (1933).15 Ibid.
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The Illinois Retailers' Occupation Tax Act, the primary source of
revenue for the state of Illinois, is in practical effect a sales tax. Because
of the limitation of the Revenue Article of the Illinois Constitution
which restricts the legislature to ad valorem property taxes or to occupa-
tion, license, or franchise taxes,1 it is in form a tax on persons engaged
in the occupation of selling tangible personal property.
The original Sales Tax Act was enacted in March, 1933,2 but was
promptly challenged in Winter v. Barrett' and was held invalid because
of certain unauthorized exemptions and provisions relating to delegation
of legislative powers of appropriation.
Almost immediately after this case, the legislature enacted the present
Retailers' Occupation Tax Act which was challenged in Reif v. Barrett4
and found not violative of any of the constitutional prohibitions raised.
The title of the invalidated Sales Tax Act had referred to "sales at
retail," but to avoid possible contention that this limited the act to sales
in small quantities, the title of the newer act omitted "at retail" and
described sales "to the purchaser, for use or consumption." 5
Although the words "at retail" were eliminated from the tide of the
new act, the phrase was retained in the body of the act and there defined
as not including transfers "for resale in any form as tangible personal
property, for a valuable consideration."8 Thus, the title of the present
act, which merely restricts the tax to sales for "use or consumption," if
given a liberal construction, is much broader and embraces more than
the body of the act, which excludes transfers for "resale in any form."
'7
From its inception, the Retailers' Occupation Tax was attacked by
various groups of vendors who claimed either that their sales were not
"for use or consumption" or were "for resale."
In a series of cases, it was held that vendors of leather to shoe repair-
men were not liable for the tax because the shoe repairmen did not use
or consume the leather within the meaning of the act.8 The repairmen,
on the other hand, were not subject to the tax because they were en-
gaged in rendering services and their transfer was merely incidental to
the rendering of such services. 9
Similar results were achieved with respect to sellers of medical supplies
111. Const. Art. IX, Sec. 1 (1870).
2 111. L. (1933) S 2, p. 938.
8352 Il. 441, 186 N.E. 113 (1933).
4 355 I. 104, 188 NE. 889 (1933).
5I1. L. (1933) S 1, p. 924.
6 Ibid.
7 Modem Dairy Co. v. Dept. of Revenue, 413 I1. 55, 108 N.E. 2d 8 (1952).
BRevzan v. Nudelman, 370 IM. 180, 18 N.E. 2d 219 (1938).
9 Babcock v. Nudelman, 367 Il. 626, 12 N.E. 2d 635 (1937).
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to hospitals and doctors' 0 and optical goods to optometrists." The fact
that the purchaser would not be liable for a tax on his: subsequent dis-
position of the goods was immaterial.1 2 In these eases the Illinois Su-
preme Court stated that in the absence of definitions of the terms "use
or consumption" in the statute, it would apply the usual and popular
meaning of the words.' 3
Following this same reasoning, in Material Service Corp. v. McKib-
bin,14 it was determined that neither material men, nor the building con-
tractors which they supplied, were subject to the tax, each for its own
peculiar reasons. It was there held that the fact that building con-
tractors use and consume materials furnished them by materialmen does
not fix the liability of the latter for a tax under the statute since the
contractor purchases such materials for the purpose of processing and
adding to a structure he has agreed to make for and deliver to the owner,
and this is not a "consumption" of the article within the meaning of that
word under the statute.
In regard to contractors, it was said that the occupation of a building
or construction contractor is the rendering of a service of skill in pro-
ducing a completed structure under his contract with the owner, and
such occupation was not subject to tax under the Retailers' Occupation
Tax Act regardless of whether the materials used are consumed in com-
pleting the structure and thereby lose their identity or whether they are
attached as fixtures.' 5
In 1941, in an effort to plug the gaps which had been created and to
clarify the situation, the legislature passed two amendments to section 1
of the act. One of these provided that "'Sale at retail' shall be construed
to include any transfer of the ownership of, or title to, tangible personal
property to a purchaser, for use or consumption by any other person to
whom such purchaser may transfer the tangible personal property with-
out a valuable consideration."
The other amendment stated that "'Use or consumption,' in addition
to its usual and popular meaning, shall be construed to include the
employment of tangible personal property by persons engaged in service
occupations . .. , where as a necessary incident to the rendering of such
services, transfer of all or of a part of the tangible personal property
employed in connection with the rendering of said services is made from
10 Mallen Co. v. Dept. of Finance, 372 Ill. 598, 25 N.E. 2d 43 (1939).
11 American Optical Co. v. Nudelman, 370 Il1. 627, 19 N.E. 2d 582 (1939).
'
2 Revzan v. Nudelman, 370 Ill. 180, 18 N.E. 2d 219 (1938).
13 Modern Dairy Co. v. Dept. of Revenue, 413 Ill. 55, 108 N.E. 2d 8 (1952).
14 380 Ill 226, 43 N.E. 2d 939 (1942).
15 Ibid.
16 111. L. (1941) Vol. I, S 1, p. 1080.
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the person engaged in the service occupation . . to his customer or
client."17
In 1944, the latter amendment was declared to be unconstitutional in
Stolze Lumber Co. v. Stratton,8 where the court stated that this amend-
ment, rather than substituting a new definition for "use or consumption,"
had sought to add to the commonly known definition a new and addi-
tional one, at the same time retaining the settled, popular meaning. The
court then strongly asserted that although the legislature may make
reasonable definitions of terms found in an act, it is well settled that it
may not declare that to be a fact which is not a fact.
Undoubtedly influenced by the Supreme Court's views in the Stolze
case, the legislature in 1945 dropped the loophole-plugging definition
of "use or consumption" from the Act.19
However, in the more recent case of Fefferman v. Marohn,'20 in which
the facts were somewhat similar to those in the present case, the pur-
chasers were held to be the users and consumers of the commodities as
contemplated by the act as long as they did not transfer further the
commodity purchased "for a consideration."
It was declared in this case that where the state and county purchase
merchandise from sellers of textiles and clothing material, and use it in
caring for the patients in their hospitals and the inmates of their institu-
tions, the state and county, not being in the business of providing such
merchandise for resale, are the consumers of the articles so purchased
in caring for their wards, and such sales to them are sales at retail within
the definition of the act.21
In the Modern Dairy case, the court follows this new trend of giving
effect to the legislative intent. In fact, they go so far as to question the
propriety of the court's refusal, in the Stolze case, to give effect to the
clearly expressed intention of the legislature. The previously strict and
narrow construction of the terms "use or consumption" is criticized and
the court goes on to point out that if the legislature, after the courts
construe the terms used in an act, attempts by amendment to define
those terms, the reasonable presumption is that the court's construction
was not in accord with the original intent of the legislature. 22
In the instant case, the court did not feel that the remaining 1941
amendment, defining "sales at retail, '23 goes beyond the scope of the
1Ibid.
18386 Il. 334, 54 N.E. 2d 554 (1944).
19 f11. L. (1945) § 1, p. 1278.
20408 111. 542, 97 N.E. 2d 785 (1951).
21 Ibid.
22 Modern Dairy Co. v. Dept. of Revenue, 413 Ill. 55, 108 NE. 2d 8 (1952).
23111 L. (1941) Vol. 1, § 1, p. 1080.
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act, as urged by the taxpayer, and stated that the legislature has the
power to make any reasonable definitions of the terms in a statute, and
such definitions, for the purpose of the act, will be sustained. 24
Thus, although they necessarily base their decision on other grounds,
the courts through their language seem to indicate that they would
probably have taken a much more receptive view of the invalidated
1941 amendment than did the court in the Stolze case.25
24 Smith v. Murphy, 384 I11. 34, 50 N.E. 2d 844 (1943).
25 Modern Dairy Co. v. Dept. of Revenue, 413 111 55, 108 N.E. 2d 8 (1952).
